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MILITANT JUDGMENT?: JUDICIAL ONTOLOGY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL POETICS, AND                        
“THE LONG WAR” 
Penelope Pether* 
 
Law is the one . . . 
To-morrow, yesterday, to-day.1 
 
[T]he truth is always produced by someone. . . .2 
 
I would like this book to be read, appreciated, staked out, and 
contested as much by the inheritors of the formal and experimental 
grandeur of . . . the law, as it is by the aesthetes of contemporary 
nihilism, the refined amateurs of literary deconstruction, the wild 
militants of a de-alienated world, and by those who are deliciously 
isolated by amorous constructions.  Finally, that they say to 
themselves, making the difficult effort to read me: that man, in the 
sense that he invents, is all of us at once.3 
 
This Article uses Badiou’s theorizing of the event and of the 
militant in Being and Event as a basis for an exploration of problems of 
judicial ontology and constitutional hermeneutics raised in recent 
decisions by common law courts dealing with the legislative and 
executive confinement of “Islamic” asylum seekers, “enemy 
combatants” and “terrorism suspects,” and certain classes of criminal 
offenders in spaces beyond the doctrines, paradigms, and institutions of 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.  Thanks are due to Jonathan 
Charnitski, Villanova University School of Law J.D. 2008, and Luke Wilson, George Washington 
University Law School J.D. 2009, for able and resourceful research assistance; to Villanova 
School of Law Faculty Services Librarian Amy Spare and Law Library research assistant Leona 
John for their unfailing ability to locate obscure sources; and to Villanova University School of 
Law Dean Mark Sargent and Associate Dean for Faculty Research John Gotanda for research 
support.  This article is dedicated to my former student Chas Licciardello, of The Chaser, for his 
militant commitment to both being and event in the context of “post-9/11” constitutionalism. 
 1 W. H. AUDEN, Law Like Love, in ANOTHER TIME 5 (1940). 
 2 LUCE IRIGARAY, THINKING THE DIFFERENCE: FOR A PEACEFUL REVOLUTION 30 (Karin 
Montin trans., Routledge 1994) (1989). 
 3 ALAIN BADIOU, BEING AND EVENT, at xiv-xv (Oliver Feltham trans., Continuum 2006) 
(1988). 
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the criminal law.  The Article proposes an ontology and a poetics of 
judging equal to the demands of “the long war,” or of “post-9/11 
constitutionalism,” on subjects serving on Western Anglophone 
common law constitutional courts. 
*** 
I am an unlikely Badiouian, finding, as I do, at least a partial and 
useful knowledge in thinking through the problem of the judicial subject 
in terms of bodies and words,4 or at least embodied subjects and 
discourses, and the institutions and disciplines with which they are 
imbricated, in and through which they are formed, and which they form 
in turn.5  As that sentence might suggest, another aspect of my work on 
the “subject(s) of law” that might strike a discordant note with Badiou’s 
philosophy of being and event is its debt to Pierre Bourdieu’s 
constructivist6 account of subject formation, especially in the 
professions,7 although I have attempted to fissure Bourdieu’s frequently 
(but not, I think, necessarily) essentializing account of subject 
formation, suggesting the usefulness of reading it through the lens of the 
iterative difference of law work and praxiological legal subjectivity.8  
Next, in the larger project of which this Article forms a comparatively 
early part, which seeks to generate a poststructuralist ethics of judging 
practice, I have found both Emmanuel Lévinas’s work on 
intersubjective ethics,9 and feminist scholarship which has applied and 
developed his “ethics of alterity,”10 to be particularly fruitful. 
And finally, worker that I am in the industry that the U.S. 
philosophical establishment experiences as outsourcing philosophy,11 
truth claims make me just as nervous as do totalizing accounts of 
 
 4 See, e.g., Penny Pether & Terry Threadgold, Feminist Methodologies in Discourse 
Analysis: Sex, Property, Equity?, in CULTURE & TEXT: DISCOURSE AND METHODOLOGY IN 
SOCIAL RESEARCH AND CULTURAL STUDIES 132 (Alison Lee & Cate Poynton eds., 2000). 
 5 See, e.g., Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff 
Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 60-63 (2007). 
 6 A characterization that Bourdieu would likely have contested. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, IN 
OTHER WORDS: ESSAYS TOWARDS A REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 123 (Matthew Adamson trans., 
Stanford University Press 1990). 
 7 See, e.g., Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 805 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987). 
 8 See, e.g., Pether & Threadgold, supra note 4, at 134-35. 
 9 See, e.g., EMMANUEL LÉVINAS, ALTERITY AND TRANSCENDENCE (Michael B. Smith 
trans., Continuum 1999) (1995); EMMANUEL LÉVINAS, OUTSIDE THE SUBJECT (Michael B. Smith 
trans., Stanford University Press 1994) (1987). 
 10 See, e.g., ELIZABETH GROSZ, SEXUAL SUBVERSIONS: THREE FRENCH FEMINISTS (1989). 
 11 I am drawing here on a symposium given at Haverford College on September 29, 2007, 
titled “Outsourcing Philosophy: Who does the work?” which was described as “[a] symposium 
highlighting philosophical work done outside the discipline of philosophy and the conditions of 
its circulation.”  See Swarthmore Dep’t of Philosophy, Outsourcing Philosophy: Who Does the 
Work, Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium 2007-2008 Program of Events, Sites of 
Philosophy, http://www.swarthmore.edu/x14857.xml (last visited Apr. 23, 2008). 
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“philosophy.”12  This last probably owes as much to the business of 
professing (common) law, particularly when one’s scholarly practice 
owes much to Peter Goodrich’s account of legal rhetoric and 
hermeneutics; one’s scholarly focus is on judging practices; and one 
does that work in a nation and at a time when intellectually 
impoverished hysterical doxa13 comprises judicial and much scholarly 
constitutional epistemology and hermeneutics, as it does to Foucault, 
and a politicoscholarly and (ontologically) constitutional 
“precommitment” to critical theory. 
But this article constitutes an enquiry, itself a species of 
intervention in the sense proposed in Being and Event,14 not a critique.  
It is set in train by differing legal “solutions,” practiced across the 
Anglo-American constitutional world, to what is at once the doctrinal 
challenge posed to pre-9/11 constitutional regimes of criminal and 
immigration law,15 and as Michel Rosenfeld has argued, also to the law 
of war, criminal law, and police powers models of responding to 
emergencies and “others,”16 and the displacement, evidently 
experienced as politically “necessary,” or at least as expedient, by neo-
 
 12 I should note here that to regard Badiou’s philosophy of being and event as being reducible 
to a totalizing systematics of truth is to neglect Oliver Feltham’s insight that the “global 
consequences” of the propositions at the heart of Being and Event “are an explorative dethroning 
of philosophy, the infinite unfolding of a materialist ontology, and the development of a new 
thought of praxis . . . .”  Oliver Feltham, Translator’s Preface to BADIOU, supra note 3, at xvii. 
 13 PETER HALLWARD, BADIOU: A SUBJECT TO TRUTH 3 (2003). 
 14 BADIOU, supra note 3, at 201-11. 
 15 A detailed analysis of the blurring in post-9/11 common law jurisdictions of the boundaries 
between these doctrinal areas (which extends beyond what is currently referred to as the 
phenomenon of “crimmigration”) is beyond the scope of this Article.  In his EIGHT O’CLOCK 
FERRY TO THE WINDWARD SIDE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN GUANTÁNAMO BAY (2007), Clive Stafford 
Smith has documented the imbrication of eviscerating asylum and refugee law with the 
pragmatics of managing the paradigmatic jurisdiction of exception, Guantánamo Bay, in 
particular when it has come to repatriating detainees, noting both that “[t]oday, some politicians 
spit out the phrase ‘asylum seeker’ as if it were sour milk.  There have been many casualties of 
the War on Terror, and among the most tragic has been the Refugee Convention, which lies 
seriously injured, close to expiring,” id. at 252, and that “[i]n recent times this attitude [of 
‘singl[ing] out at as a threat to the nation asylum seekers, the tiny fraction of people fleeing from 
one country to another to avoid persecution?].”  Id. at 253.  He continues:  
In recent times this attitude seems to have taken hold first in Australia, where pictures 
of boat people flooded the news. Many of those being excluded by Prime Minister 
John Howard were fleeing Afghanistan at precisely the moment that Australian 
soldiers were trying to expel the intolerant Taliban regime.  More recently, Tony Blair 
has turned the spotlight on those seeking asylum in Britain, calling on the tabloids to 
man the barricades. . . . The cynical attitude of the British government to the plight of 
such people is pitiful and the ramifications of these policies reached deep into 
Guantánamo Bay, where British refugees waited in vain for assistance. 
Id. at 253-54. 
 16 Michel Rosenfeld, Judicial Balancing in Times of Stress: Comparing the American, 
British, and Israeli Approaches to the War on Terror, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2079 (2006).  
Stafford Smith identifies both the U.S. treatment of alleged “enemy combatants” in the War on 
Terror and such examples of the treatment of asylum seekers as examples of “the politics of 
hatred.”  STAFFORD, supra note 15, at 252. 
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imperial executive governments,17 of Anglo-American (post?) national 
anxiety onto others experienced as inhuman and threatening the 
integrity of the nation state: the “Islamic” man and the “sexually violent 
predator.”  Although an analysis of the phenomenon is beyond the 
scope of this Article, these two categories are conflated in a series of 
recent Australian sexual assault cases, documented in varying degrees 
of detail in Paul Sheehan’s virulently Islamophobic book Girls Like 
You,18 and more mutedly in debates surrounding the much-publicized 
successive Nebraska prosecutions of Pamir Safi, an Afghanistan-
born19member of the U.S. armed forces, for the alleged rape of then-
college student, former sorority girl, and Republican activist Tory 
Bowen.20 
This Article will focus on two subsets of the cases referred to 
above.  The first is English cases addressing the constitutionality of the 
detention and surveillance of terrorism suspects who have not done 
enough to make them subject to criminal prosecution that has any 
likelihood of success, some of whom, although non-citizens, cannot be 
deported because of constitutionalist anxieties about likely “human 
rights” abuses they would experience in receiving countries.  The 
second is Australian constitutional cases framing the indefinite 
detention without trial of “Islamic” asylum seekers and what in the U.S. 
context are called “sexually violent predators” in terms of the nature of 
the judicial power exercised by Chapter III courts.21  It will use these 
cases to attempt to generate an account of common law judicial 
ontology and of a poetics of judging, informed by Badiou’s thought in 
Being and Event and related writings, equal to what may—or of course 
may not—be an event: I’m tentatively naming it “post-9/11 common 
law constitutionalism.”  My thinking on this question owes much to 
Oliver Feltham’s glosses on and modeling of the praxiological uses of 
Badiou’s thought, in particular his 2004 essay, Singularity Happening in 
Politics: the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, Canberra, 1972.22  It is also 
 
 17 Some of these acts have been done under color of legislative authorization, but the 
powerful influence of executive government on U.S., British, and Australian legislators in the 
open-ended “state of exception” that has increasingly come to characterize Western democracies 
post-9/11 has seen a shifting from formally parliamentary to de facto presidential systems in 
Britain and Australia, and has shifted the U.S. separation of powers model to a significantly more 
presidential model.  With the recent defeat of the Howard government in Australia, there exists 
the possibility of national structures of “democratic” governance emerging that are more broadly 
participatory. 
 18 PAUL SHEEHAN, GIRLS LIKE YOU (FOUR YOUNG GIRLS, SIX BROTHERS AND A CULTURAL 
TIMEBOMB) (2006). 
 19 Paul Hammel, Attempts to “Intimidate” Cited in Rape Case Mistrial, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, July 13, 2007, at A1. 
 20 See, e.g., Paul Hammel, No New Trial in “Rape” Ban Case, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 
Jan. 4, 2008, at B1. 
 21 The Australian constitutional equivalent of Article III courts under the U.S. Constitution. 
 22 Oliver Feltham, Singularity Happening in Politics: The Aboriginal Tent Embassy, 
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assisted by Michel Rosenfeld’s insightful 2006 Cardozo Law Review 
article, Judicial Balancing in Times of Stress: Comparing the American, 
British, and Israeli Approaches to the War on Terror.23 
In a series of post-9/11 constitutional cases involving the detention 
of Islamic terrorism suspects that began with the trial phases of what 
became A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (A. [No.1])24, 
English25 trial courts, and both the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords, have been confronted with the challenge of how English 
“constitutional law” should guide English “constitutional” courts in 
contexts where they are asked by the executive26 to be complicit with 
“human rights-denying” legislation or executive acts.  This English 
constitutional law is a ragtag hybrid of supra-national English law as 
formed by the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on 
Human Rights; the “ancient constitution”;27 the common law; principles 
of statutory interpretation developed by English Courts before the 
passage of the Human Rights Act28 which provided for limited judicial 
review of legislation circumscribing English constitutional “rights”;29 a 
“thick” account of Diceyan constitutionalism30 based on “regular 
 
Canberra 1972, 37 COMM. & COGNITION 225 (2004). 
 23 Rosenfeld, supra note 16. 
 24 [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87.  As a result of this case, in A. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (A. 
[No. 2]), [2005] 3 W.L.R. 1249, the House of Lords addressed the question of the admissibility in 
British Courts of evidence allegedly obtained by off-shore torturing of detainees by non-British 
authorities. 
 25 I am using the term “English” rather than the arguably formally apposite “British” in an 
attempt to register the varying institutional instantiations of Scottish and Northern Irish self-
government, and of Welsh nationalism. 
 26 Formally Britain is a hybrid constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. The 
“executive” to which I am referring here is Tony Blair’s distinctively presidential Prime 
Ministership, arguably one among a modern sequence including both the Churchill and Thatcher 
governments. 
 27 See, e.g., G. J. A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY 
OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1957).  Both sides in the 
seventeenth century struggles over Royal lawmaking authority laid claim to the phrase, and the 
authority of what it signified; Sir Edward Coke was a particular adherent of the phrase. 
 28 See, e.g., TONY BLACKSHIELD & GEORGE WILLIAMS, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW AND THEORY: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 117 (4th ed. 2006) (noting that “Dicey’s 
view that the common law is a sufficient protector of civil liberties has been superseded in the 
United Kingdom by the enactment of a statutory Bill of Rights—the Human Rights Act 1998 
(UK), which incorporates the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1950 into United Kingdom Law. However the Act still incorporates a 
significant degree of deference to parliamentary sovereignty: where a statute is found to infringe 
the European Convention, the only judicial remedy is a ‘declaration of incompatibility’, which 
may then trigger a statutory amendment (or, in an extreme case, an interim amendment by 
executive order, without waiting for Parliament’s approval). 
 29 For an account of this technique, see, for example, Eric Barendt, Dicey and Civil Liberties, 
1985 PUBLIC LAW 596. 
 30 For an account of this concept, see Penelope Pether, Regarding the Miller Girls: Daisy, 
Judith, and the Seeming Paradox of In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 19 L. & 
LITERATURE 187 (2007). 
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law . . . . [T]he law of the Constitution, the rules which in foreign 
countries naturally form part of the constitutional code, [but which in 
England] are not the sources, but the consequence of the rights of 
individuals, as defined and enforced by the courts, . . . the ordinary law 
of the land”;31 international and European human rights law; and more 
conventional domestic jurisprudence on doctrines relating to judicial 
power, including but not limited to abuse of process. 32 
A brief account of the development of the relevant post-9/11 
English constitutional law is in order at this point.  In response to the 
events of September 11, 2001, the Blair government concluded that it 
would, pursuant to section 14 of the Human Rights Act 1998, derogate 
from Article 5(3) of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the ECHR”) which 
guarantees “liberty and security of person,” and passed temporary 
emergency powers, subject to renewal, in Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 (“the 2001 Act”).33  Article 5(3) of the 
ECHR provides, inter alia, that “Everyone arrested or detained in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this Article34 shall 
be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to 
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable 
time or to release pending trial.”  The reason for the derogation was that 
there was said to be a “public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation” within the meaning of the ECHR. 
The 2001 Act provided in sections 21 and 23 for temporary or 
indefinite detention of a person who was not a British citizen and who 
was reasonably suspected of being an “international terrorist,” and 
whose presence in the U.K. was believed by the Secretary of State to be 
a risk to national security, when the Secretary of State suspected that the 
 
 31 A. V. Dicey, quoted in SIR IVOR JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 305-06 (5th 
ed. 1959). 
 32 See, e.g., the discussion of comparative common law doctrines developed by courts in the 
U.S., Ireland, Australia, and Canada on admitting evidence in breach of canons of “fundamental 
fairness,” in A. [No. 2], [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1262. 
 33 While a detailed comparison of pre- and post-9/11 anti-terrorism legislation in the U.K. is 
beyond the scope of the present Article, the 2001 Act and its 2005 successor were distinctively 
different from their predecessor anti-terrorism statutes, the Terrorism Act 2000, the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) 
Act 1996, both because those predecessor acts were directed explicitly and exclusively towards 
“terrorism” connected with the IRA, and related bodies, and because they did not seek radically to 
circumscribe the conventional protections offered to persons accused of criminal offenses in the 
ways and to the extent proposed by the 2001 and 2005 Acts. 
 34 Which provides that “[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person.  No one 
shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following case . . . . the lawful arrest or detention of a 
person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on 
reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered 
necessary to prevent him committing an offense or fleeing after having done so.”  European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 5, opened for 
signature Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 005. 
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person was a “terrorist who could not be deported because of fears for 
their safety or other practical considerations.”35  Such detention was 
authorized by the issuing of a certificate by the Secretary of State.36  
Judicial review of such detention was limited by the legislation, initially 
to review by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”).37  
SIAC could take evidence in a range of ways that raise procedural 
fairness questions, including those implicated in the right to confront, 
the right to counsel, the standard of proof, the burden of proof, and the 
scope of judicial review,38 all in the novel context of what are often but 
not exclusively “pre-criminal”39 cases. 
On December 24, 2004, the House of Lords held in A. [No.1]40 that 
Section 23 of the 2001 Act was incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 of 
the ECHR.  With effect from 14 March 2005 Part 4 of the 2001 Act 
(which contained Sections 21 and 23) was repealed by s16 of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.41  The “torture question” raised by 
the allegations by one of the detainees who brought A. [No. 1] that his 
detention was based on “evidence of a third party obtained through his 
torture in a foreign state”42  was specifically saved43 for the proceedings 
 
 35 A. [No. 2], [2005] 3 W.L.R. 1249 at 1249. 
 36 Id. at 1256. 
 37 Id. at 1257. 
 38 Id. 
 39 My reference here is to the Steven Spielberg film MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox et 
al. 2002), a version of a Philip K. Dick short story of the same name, which depicted the 
operations of a department of “Pre-Crime” in what looked at that time like a futuristic world.  
Recent reporting by the BBC has revealed that this scenario, involving as it does the prosecution 
of crimes by “criminals” before their intended crimes were committed, is today significantly less 
futuristic: British researchers are presently developing, for the use of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, biometric software that purports to be able to identify intending terrorists at 
airports, by means of interpreting their facial expressions, including those coded as expressing 
rage and disgust.  The fact remains that the traditional criminal law process would be a much less 
contentious means of “disciplining and punishing” those who had done enough under 
conventional criminal law doctrine to be subjected to such prosecution with reasonable chances of 
success of conviction, especially given the history of the U.K.’s legislative responses to the 
activities of the IRA.  Thus, as a practical matter, those who are prosecuted under the 2005 Act 
are likely to be people who are either alleged potential or intending “terrorists” who have not 
done enough to be caught by traditional criminal accomplice liability or inchoate offense law, 
and/or persons who are perceived as at risk of committing terrorist acts beyond the geographical 
jurisdiction of traditional U.K. criminal law, and/or persons against whom evidence gathered in 
non-traditional ways, for example by torture or illegally or secretly, would either not be 
admissible in criminal courts, and/or would not meet the criminal evidentiary standard of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt, and/or would not be desired to be admitted in a way which made the 
evidence “public” or even available to the defense by the security services who gathered it.  The 
language of sections 2(1)(a), 4(3)(b) and (d), and section 4(7)(a) of the 2005 Act, relating to non-
derogating and derogating control orders respectively, which imposes “reasonable grounds for 
suspecting,” “reasonable grounds for believing,” and “balance of probabilities” standards of proof 
respectively make this clear, as do the evidentiary standards in section 4(3)(a), and the definitions 
of “involvement in terrorism-related activity” in section 1(9). 
 40 A. [No. 1], [2005] 2 W.L.R. at 87. 
 41 A. [No. 2], [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1312-13. 
 42 Id. at 1249. 
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in A. [No.2].44  
The Prevention of Terrorism Act (“the 2005 Act”) was passed on 
11 March 2005.45  While the 2001 Act only applied to non-citizens,46 
the 2005 Act applies to both citizens and non-citizens,47 and provides 
for a dual regime of derogating (issued by SIAC)48 and non-derogating 
(issued by the Secretary of State)49 control orders over persons both 
“reasonably suspected” of being or having been involved in terrorist-
related activity and posing an alleged future risk of terrorism to the 
public. 
Derogating control orders have two additional requirements: they 
may be imposed where the evidence supporting the making of the 
control order is of higher quality than it would be in the case of non-
derogating control orders, and where the relatively severe restrictions on 
the liberty of “controlees” that will be imposed on them derogate in 
whole or in part from rights conferred by Article 5 of the ECHR.50  
Derogating control orders differ from non-derogating control orders in 
that the former are “incompatible with the controlee’s right to liberty 
under Article 5 [of the ECHR] . . . [and] can [only] be made where there 
has been a designated derogation within section 14 of the [HRA].”51  
Control orders differ from detention in that they impose surveillance 
and restrictions on freedom, including restrictions that are often 
practically equivalent to house arrest,52 rather than detention in a prison 
like the notorious Belmarsh,53 where many of those detained under the 
2001 Act had been incarcerated, or other government facility. 
On the passage of the 2005 Act a number of “suspected terrorists,” 
who had been detained pursuant to certificates issued under the 2001 
Act, were then released and made subject to control orders under the 
2005 Act; or were made subject to control orders under the 2005 Act 
and given notice of intention to deport; or voluntarily left the U.K. and 
had their certification under the 2001 Act revoked after their departure; 
or were confined in Broadmoor (a high security psychiatric hospital 
which doubles as a “forensic” prison) under the Mental Health Act; or 
 
 43 Id. at 1255-56, 1318. 
 44 Id. at 1255-56. 
 45 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c.2 (Eng.). 
 46 A. [No. 2], [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1256. 
 47 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c.2, § 1(1) (Eng.). 
 48 Id. at § 4. 
 49 Id. at § 2. 
 50 Id. at § 1(2)(b), § 10, §4(3). 
 51 Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. M.B. (Re M.B.), [2006] EWHC (Admin) 1000, ¶ 4 
(Eng.). 
 52 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c.2, § 7 (Eng.), catalogs the control order conditions 
that may be imposed on a controlee. 
 53 See, e.g., Denise Winterman, Belmarsh—Britain’s Guantanamo Bay?, BBC NEWS, Oct. 6, 
2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/3714864.stm. 
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were confined in Broadmoor under the Mental Health Act, then 
subsequently released and made subject to a control order under the 
2005 Act.54  The proposed deportees were detained while deportation 
proceedings were pending, and as a result the control orders covering 
them were discharged.55  At least some of the persons either not 
subjected to deportation proceedings, but rather made subject to control 
orders, or detained pending deportation proceedings, were ones who 
might be subject to human rights abuses by possible deportation 
destination nations.56 The timelines for these events ran from 2001to 
2005. 
All of the challenges to control orders under the 2005 Act have 
related to non-derogating control orders, and as of June 2007, seventeen 
control orders had been issued under the 2005 Act, and a number of 
persons subject to them had absconded.57  Between June and September 
in 2007, a further two control orders were issued;58 subsequent 
additional challenges to more recently-issued control orders to those 
discussed infra have been made.59 
As indicated supra, A. [No. 2] concerned a provision of SIAC’s 
procedural rules that allowed “evidence that would not be admissible in 
a court of law”60 to be received by SIAC, and allegedly involved 
reliance by the Secretary of State on evidence produced by third party 
torture conducted in a foreign state.61  The House of Lords held that 
evidence inadmissible on a range of “constitutional” grounds, dividing 
on the question of the burden of proof on appellant and government, on 
the standard of proof to be applied by SIAC when considering whether 
evidence before it had been obtained by torture in a foreign state, and on 
the appropriate response by SIAC to questions about whether the 
evidence had been obtained by torture. 62 
While the majority of the House of Lords held that evidence 
obtained by torture in a foreign country is inadmissible in proceedings 
in U.K. courts, it also held that express statutory words would be 
 
 54 A. [No. 2], [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1258. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Home Office Security News and Publications, Control Order Quarterly Statement (June 
11- Sept. 10, 2007), Sept. 17, 2007, http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/news-
speeches/494245. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 These relate to control orders issued after the initial group discussed in this Article. See, 
e.g., Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. A.F. [2007] EWHC (Admin) 651; A.F. v. Sec’y of 
State for the Home Dep’t [2007] EWHC (Admin) 2001; Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. E. 
[2007] EWHC (Admin) 233; Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. E. [2007] EWCA (Civ) 459; 
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. E. [2007] UKHL 47.  A.F.’s appeals were consolidated with 
those of M.B., discussed in text infra. 
 60 A. [No. 2], [2005] 3 W.L.R. 1249 at 1257. 
 61 Id. at 1255-56. 
 62 Id. at 1250. 
PETHER.FINAL.VERSION 5/1/2008  12:15:59 AM 
2288 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:5 
required before SIAC could admit evidence obtained by torture, 
effectively making it possible for the U.K.’s “sovereign parliament” to 
render it admissible, at least before SIAC, which, although it is 
constituted as a court of record, can comprise of “persons holding or 
having held high judicial office, persons who are or who have been 
appointed as chief adjudicators under the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act 2002, persons who are or have been qualified to be 
members of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal and experienced lay 
members,” that are “appointed by the Lord Chancellor”;63 at least in 
proceedings that do not involve the adjudication of criminal guilt, but 
rather lie at the “interface” of the criminal law and executive acts;64 and 
at least under the 2001 Act.65  That is, within the framework of the 
judicial review conventionally permissible in English constitutional 
doctrine, the legislature would have explicitly to limit “human rights” 
before the courts would interpret a statute as having that effect, and the 
relevant provision of the SIAC’s rules of procedure “could not be 
interpreted as authorizing displacement of [‘the exclusionary rule 
barring evidence procured by torture’].”66 
The majority in the House of Lords further held that because of the 
limited evidentiary information available to detainees in these 
proceedings about the basis for their proposed detention, their burden 
was to raise a plausible reason that evidence might have been obtained 
by torture, and that SIAC bore the burden of initiating inquiries into the 
matter; that if on the balance of probabilities SIAC determined the 
evidence had been obtained by torture it was bound to exclude it.  
However, (over three dissents) the court held that where it was doubtful 
about whether the evidence had been obtained by torture it should admit 
the evidence, bearing the doubt in mind when weighing its probative 
value. 
On 12 April 2006, Justice Sullivan of the Queen’s Bench Division 
of the High Court of Justice (Administrative Court) held in Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v. M.B.67 that “the procedures in section 
3 of the 2005 Act relating to the supervision by the [High Court of 
Justice] of non-derogating control orders . . . were incompatible with the 
. . . right to a fair hearing under Article 6(1) of the [ECHR].”  This 
declaration was made pursuant to section 4(2) of the HRA.  The 
particular provisions of the 2005 Act challenged related to the High 
Court’s following a “special procedure, involving closed material68 and 
 
 63 Id. at 1257. 
 64 See, e.g., the judgment of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, id. at 1289-90. 
 65 See, e.g., id. at 1291. 
 66 Id. at 1250. 
 67 [2006] EWHC (Admin) 1000. 
 68 That is, secret evidence, not made available to the terrorism suspect nor to his counsel. 
Similar issues have arisen in post-9/11 constitutional cases in the U.S. 
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the use of a Special Advocate [to review evidence not made available to 
a defendant or his counsel], that is similar to” SIAC’s procedure.  The 
use of secret evidence not available to the controlee was one basis for 
Sullivan’s decision; he wrote, “[t]he basis for the Security Service’s 
confidence [M.B. was engaged in terrorism-related activity] is wholly 
contained within the closed material [not available to M.B.].  Without 
access to that material it is difficult to see how, in reality, the respondent 
could make any effective challenge to what is, in the open case before 
him, no more than a bare assertion.”69  Justice Sullivan’s decision also 
involved the High Court’s application of “principles applicable on an 
application for judicial review” in supervising non-derogating control 
orders under the 2005 Act in considering “whether any of the any of the 
decisions of the Secretary of State in relation to the making of the 
control order was flawed.”  Here Justice Sullivan concluded that the 
scope of judicial review was limited to assessing the reasonableness of 
the Secretary of State’s decision based on the material available to the 
Secretary when he made the decision to issue a control order, excluding 
evidentiary material developed subsequent to its issuing; that “[t]he 
function of the court was to review the decision of the Secretary of 
State, not to form its own view of the merits of the case;70 and that “[i]n 
performing its [judicial review] function, the court was required to 
apply a particularly low standard of proof.”71 
Justice Sullivan, the trial judge, was clearly additionally exercised 
both by the question of whether at least in some circumstances control 
order proceedings could be properly characterized as criminal rather 
than civil,72 and by the entrusting to the British “Executive Branch” of a 
decision that might properly be regarded as necessarily judicial.73  He 
determined that because of the circumscription of the ambit of judicial 
review of Executive decisions to impose non-derogating control orders, 
the provisions for judicial review of non-derogating control orders 
under the 2005 Act were inadequate to provide for judicial review that 
was procedurally fair.74  He concluded: 
To say that the [2005] Act does not give the respondent. . . 
against who a non-derogating control order has been made by 
the Secretary of State, a fair hearing n the determination of his 
rights under Article 8 of the . . . [ECHR] would be an 
understatement.  The Court would be failing in its duty under 
the [Human Rights Act, 1998] . . . , a duty imposed upon the 
court by Parliament, if it did not say, loud and clear, that the 
 
 69 Re M.B., [2006] EWHC (Admin) 1000, ¶ 67. 
 70 Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. M.B., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1140, ¶ 31.  
 71 Id. 
 72 Re M.B., [2006] EWHC (Admin) 1000, ¶¶ 36-41. 
 73 Id. at ¶¶ 43-50. 
 74 Id. at ¶¶ 100-103, 104. 
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procedure under the [2005] Act whereby the court merely 
reviews the lawfulness of the Secretary of State’s decision to 
make the order upon the basis of the material available to him 
at that earlier stage is conspicuously unfair.  The thin veneer of 
legality which is sought to be applied by section 3 of the Act 
cannot disguise the reality.  That controlees’ rights under the 
Convention are being determined not by an independent court 
in compliance with Article 6.1 [of the ECHR], but by 
executive decision-making, untrammeled by any prospect of 
effective judicial supervision.75 
On June 26 2006, Justice Sullivan held in Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v. J.J.76 that non-derogating control orders imposed 
on the six defendants were incompatible with their right to liberty under 
Article 5 of the ECHR, and that the appropriate remedy was to quash 
the control orders.  The control orders, inter alia, confined the 
controlees to the interiors of their residences, which in all but one case 
were one bedroom apartments provided by the government in which the 
detainees had not lived prior to their detention, and located in areas 
where they had not lives prior to their detention, except for the hours 
between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. each day.77 Their movements in the six 
hours excepted from the curfew were extremely constrained, as was 
their ability to receive visitors.78 
On 1 August 2006, the Court of Appeal handed down two 
judgments, one in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. M.B. 
(Re M.B.)79 and one in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. 
J.J. (Re J.J.)80.  In the former judgment the Court of Appeal held that 
reliance on secret evidence is permissible “on terms that appropriate 
safeguards against the prejudice that this may cause to the controlled 
person are in place.”81  It reasoned that “the provisions of the PTA for 
the use of a special advocate, and of the rules of court made pursuant to 
paragraph 4 of the Schedule to the PTA, constitute appropriate 
safeguards [regarding non-disclosure of evidence]”; and that Justice 
Sullivan was “in error in holding that the provisions for review by the 
Court of the making of a non-derogating control order by the Secretary 
of State do not comply with the requirements of Article 6” of the 
ECHR, which prescribes “fair” judicial review of infringements of civil 
rights.82  In its judgment in Re J.J., the Court of Appeal dismissed the 
 
 75 Id. at ¶ 104. 
 76 [2006] EWHC (Admin) 1623. 
 77 Re J.J., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1141, ¶ 4. 
 78 Id. 
 79 [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1140. 
 80 [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1141. 
 81  Re M. B., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1140, at ¶ 86. 
 82 Id. at ¶ 87. 
PETHER.FINAL.VERSION 5/1/2008  12:15:59 AM 
2008] MILITANT JUDGMENT?  2291 
Secretary of State’s appeal and affirmed Justice Sullivan’s judgment.83 
Appeals from the Re J.J.84 and Re M.B.85 cases (the latter in a joint 
opinion dealing with further aspects of the A. case that inaugurated 
these tests for British constitutional judging (and another related case, 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. E.)86) were heard by the 
House of Lords in July 2007, and judgments in those cases were handed 
down on October 31, 2007.  They reveal, among other things, a House 
of Lords (and indeed a British Judiciary) radically and profoundly 
troubled by,87 and often split on,88 issues including the scope and nature 
of judicial review of executive action in issuing control orders; when the 
terms and conditions of a control order will be so extreme as to amount 
to a deprivation of liberty, and thus in whose jurisdiction lawful 
deprivation of liberty lies; how to characterize control order 
proceedings—as civil or criminal; and what fairness or “justice”89—
acting in a judicial way—in this novel context requires of judges.  The 
question left unanswered in A. [No. 2]: whether the U.K.’s sovereign 
legislature could legislate to make evidence obtained by torture 
admissible in a court performing “judicial” functions, perhaps 
constitutes the paradigm case of this crisis of judicial ontology and 
ethics, which is a crisis of equality: is the democratic governance, of 
which the “rule of law” is a fundamental part, a question of majoritarian 
tyranny and law as state power, or is it egalitarian, oriented towards 
justice; is the judge equal to judging others as his equals? 
The strategy of the Bush government of using Guantánamo Bay, 
other “secret” offshore prisons, and extraordinary rendition, to bolster 
legislative jurisdiction-stripping of the Federal Courts’ power of judicial 
review of “enemy combatant” detention has meant that U.S. enemy 
combatant jurisprudence has not as directly addressed the issues of 
judicial ethics and ontology, the nature of judicial power, as has been 
the case in the United Kingdom.90 This has been exacerbated by the 
 
 83 Re J. J., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1141, at ¶ 27. 
 84 [2007] UKHL 45. 
 85 [2007] UKHL 46. 
 86 E. appears to have been the only one of the detainees who brought A. [No. 1] who was only 
subject to a control order under the 2005 Act and not subjected to additional deportation 
proceedings or Mental Health Act proceedings. 
 87 In both the subjective and objective senses. 
 88 They are ad idem, however, on the likely obligation of the British authorities under the 
regime established by the 2005 Act to prosecute someone whom it is sought to make subject to a 
control order for a crime where there are “realistic prospects” of “successfully” doing so, and on 
holding that a conclusion as to realistic prospects of prosecution is not a condition precedent to 
the making of a valid control order 
 89 Re M.B., [2007] UKHL 46, at ¶ 14. 
 90 The U.S. Supreme Court has approached these cases rather from the perspective of formal 
separation of powers analysis and conventional constitutional hermeneutics, or from a range of 
procedural perspectives, ranging from the narrow question of the formally correct parties to a 
habeas corpus action to the rights of non-citizen detainees to the prerogative writ of habeas 
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present thinness of Article III power jurisprudence, and the 
contemporary ascendancy of modes of constitutional interpretation 
including an etiolated version of proportionality review and the 
privileging of a majoritarian imperative that reflexively defers to 
executive fiats clothed in legislative authority.  However, similar issues 
to those troubling the English Courts have arisen in two sets of post-
9/11 constitutional decisions issued by the Australian High Court. 
One of these groups of Australian post-9/11 Constitutional cases 
involves the legality of executive detention of “Islamic” asylum seekers; 
the other involves the “preventive detention” of persons who in U.S. 
parlance would be labeled “sexually violent predators.”  Doctrinally, 
Australia’s hybrid of a thin Diceyan and entrenched written constitution 
(although without a Bill of Rights), explicitly modeled on the U.S. 
original, has meant that these issues have been framed in terms of the 
nature and incidents of Chapter III judicial power.  The signal divide on 
the court has been between (recently retired) Justice Michael McHugh, 
an assiduous if selective student of U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence 
and theory, and Justice Michael Kirby, the Gleeson Court’s increasingly 
isolated dissenter.  Justice McHugh has called the plight of the 
indefinitely-detained asylum seekers, in the absence of a written Bill of 
Rights, a matter for the tragedian rather than the jurist,91 and in a mode 
becoming characteristic of the Gleeson High Court in passing judgment 
on “others,” has used narrow legalist and textualist strategies effectively 
to deny jurisdiction to intervene to limit indefinite executive detention.92  
Justice Kirby, on the other hand, has theorized Article III courts’ 
jurisdiction to protect substantive as well as procedural rights93 in terms 
that evoke “the other Coke,”94 Lord Cooke of Thorndon,95 who framed 
common law constitutional judicial power in the following terms, 
questioning “the extent to which in New Zealand even an Act of 
Parliament can take away the right of citizens to resort to the ordinary 
 
corpus.  U.S. trial court judges who have tried post-9/11 terrorism suspects thus far have been 
markedly less troubled than their English brethren about the use of evidence allegedly obtained 
by torture, although there are at present before the Federal courts challenges to the use of secret 
evidence that have the capacity to produce different outcomes than those achieved thus far in the 
“torture” cases. 
 91 Al-Kateb v. Godwin (2004) 219 C.L.R. 562, 581 (Kirby, J., dissenting). 
 92 Id. at 584-86. 
 93 Id. at 618. 
 94 I refer here to Coke’s judgment in Doctor Bonham’s case that “in many cases, the common 
law will control acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void; for when an 
Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be 
performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such act to be void.”  8 Co. Rep. at 11a; 
77 E.R. at 652. 
 95 A judge and later President of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, Sir Robin Cooke, who 
became Lord Cooke of Thorndon and a member of the Privy Council, and sat in the House of 
Lords. 
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Courts of Law for determination of their rights.”96  Signally for my 
purposes in this Article, Justice Kirby has repeatedly and explicitly 
invoked challenges posed to constitutionalism by the reverberations of 
the Third Reich in domestic, comparative, transnational, and 
international law contexts in accounting for the Gleeson Court’s now 
characteristic deference to legislature and executive. 
At the heart of Justice Sullivan’s judgment in Re M.B., and also of 
the dual regime of derogating and non-derogating control orders 
established by the 2005 Act, as with the U.S. “enemy combatant” 
litigation97 is a question of a judicial method that goes to the heart of 
constitutionalism, understood as the theory of accommodation between 
state interests and “rights”; and which derives from those events that 
took place in Germany from 1933 to 1945 that give rise to both modern 
comparative constitutional law and modern human rights regimes 
including both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
ECHR: so-called “proportionality review.”  As Lorraine Weinrib 
notes,98 proportionality review forms part of a mode of judicial review 
called “justification analysis” and it involves first legality and then 
legitimacy analysis.99  Legality analysis is overtly formalistic: it asks 
whether the law has been made in a way that is legal for positive law-
making in that nation, including “principled elaboration of common 
law.”  The mode of legitimacy analysis is called proportionality 
analysis, and its purpose, for all that its commitments are arguably 
formal100 rather than normative, is to maintain the “primacy of respect 
for human dignity.”101 
 
 96 N.Z. Drivers’ Ass’n v. N.Z. Road Carriers, [1982] 1 N.Z.L.R. 374, 390 (C.A.).  In Fraser v. 
State Services Comm’n, [1984] 1 N.Z.L.R. 116, 121 (C.A.), he opined that “it is arguable that 
some common law rights may go so deep that even Parliament cannot be accepted by the Courts 
to have destroyed them.”).  See also Taylor v. N.Z. Poultry Bd., [1984] 1 N.Z.L.R. 394, 398 
(C.A.). 
 97 See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 2081-84, 2089-95, 2102-18. 
 98 Lorraine E. Weinrib, Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism, in 
DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3 (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark 
Tushnet eds., 2002). 
 99 Id. at 17-18. 
 100 The steps in proportionality analysis are as follows: 
! Consider objective of enactment or action under review. 
! Ask if the objective of the enactment or action is of sufficiently high 
importance to warrant superseding a constitutional guarantee. 
! Consider if the State has established that law or decision under review 
forwards its objective directly (needs rational connection to stated 
objective). 
! Consider whether encroachment on right intrudes on the right only to the 
extent necessary to meet its objective. 
! Ask whether the desired and actual benefit of the enactment or action exceed 
the detriment effected by the infringement of the right. 
See id. at 18. 
 101 Id. at 18. 
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As with Badiou’s own trenchant excoriation of relativism, which 
he characterizes as a “thoroughgoing skepticism which reduced the 
effects of truth to particular anthropological operations,”102 Justice 
Sullivan’s judgment in Re M.B. manifests a situationally equally 
fundamental mistrust of the relativism that characterizes proportionality 
review, evident in his dis-ease about, and what is his resistance to or a 
breaking from the ethos of proportionality review103 and a drawing on 
what I will tentatively call a common law judicial ontology104 to 
generate a new post-9/11 common law constitutional jurisprudence.  
Badiou’s characterization of institutionalized human rights culture of 
the kind arguably encoded in proportionality review as “flabby 
reactionary philosophy” and “moral philosophy disguised as political 
philosophy,”105 might be useful in beginning to characterize the regime 
of judicial review established by the HRA and the 2001 and 2005 Acts 
as they are interpreted by Justice Sullivan, and both the ideologically 
fractured and frequently incoherent jurisprudence of the House of Lords 
judgments in the English cases surveyed in this Article, and the 
radically decontextualized judicial power jurisprudence of the majority 
on the Gleeson High Court. 
Badiou’s brief synopsis of his project in Being and Event offers a 
way of framing the crisis of judicial ontology and constitutionalism 
facing the common law constitutional judiciary post-9/11, one that 
might assist us in identifying the jurisprudential praxis of Justice 
Sullivan.  “A truth,” Badiou writes, “is solely constituted by rupturing 
with the order which supports it. . . . [T]his type of rupture which opens 
up truth [constitutes] ‘the event.’”  “The infinite work of truth is. . . that 
of a ‘generic procedure’.  And to be a Subject. . . is to be a local active 
dimension of such a procedure”; “an active fidelity to the event of 
truth. . . . a militant of truth.”106  Additionally, Badiou’s praxiological 
commitments107 in Being and Event to the unpredictable and limitless 
instantiation of truth procedures108 suggest a peculiar aptness of his 
thinking about ontology and generic procedures for evental sites which 
 
 102 BADIOU, supra note 3, at xii. 
 103 Re M.B., [2006] EWHC (Admin) 1000, ¶¶ 60, 74, 79, 80. 
 104 Following Goodrich’s account of common law in THE LAWS OF LOVE: A BRIEF 
HISTORICAL AND PRACTICAL MANUAL (2006), and proceeding from Peter Hallward's account of 
Badiou's ontology: 
At the operational foundation of Badiou's ontology we find neither revealed word nor 
reconstituted thing but the subject in its purest form.  What comes first is the decision 
and the decider, the subject who asserts the axiom: the subject who decides questions 
beyond proof who affirms the inconsistent medium of being and who takes another 
step in the (endless) pursuit of ontological consistency. 
HALLWARD, supra note 13, at 76. 
 105 BADIOU, supra note 3, at xi. 
 106 Id. at xii-xiii. 
 107 Feltham, supra note 12, at xxi-xxii. 
 108 Id. at xx. 
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post-9/11 constitutional law—or constitutionalism—in Western 
Anglophone common law systems might encounter.  Further, Feltham’s 
application of Badiou’s philosophy of being and event to contemporary 
Australian race relations, specifically in the relations between 
indigenous and invader subjects, suggests both the utility of Badiou’s 
method for thinking through general and abstract questions of the 
relationship between judging, constitutionalism, and others, and that 
like contemporary Native Title jurisprudence in Australia, that 
relationship’s recent refiguring in terms of Chapter III judicial power 
might likewise be usefully framed in terms of Badiou’s thinking on 
ontology and on truth procedures.  Of specific relevance to my project 
here, Feltham’s analysis of indigenous politics in Australia is an 
especially helpful model for applying Badiou’s thought in Being and 
Event to those aspects of the jurisprudence of exception that I am 
concerned with in this Article. 
Feltham anatomizes Badiou’s “theory of structural change through 
praxis,” noting that [a]ccording to [Badiou’s] . . . theory, for a practical 
procedure to transform the basic structure of a situation . . . a number of 
factors must always be at work:”109 
An abnormal event has occurred which interrupts the functioning of 
the situation. 
This event occurs at a specific point within the situation, a sort of 
weak point or stress fracture, which the dominant representative  
powers of the situation do not fully understand or control; an ‘evental 
site’. 
Instead of rejecting the event as an anomaly, someone recognises it 
and names it as belonging to the situation.  This is called the 
‘intervention’. 
The intervention is followed by actions which explore and develop 
the consequences of the event’s belonging to the situation or the 
nature and structure of that situation.  It is these actions— 
‘enquiries’—which make up what Badiou calls a ‘procedure of 
fidelity’ to the event. 
This series of actions must not conform to any preestablished 
program for political action; this non-conformity guarantees the 
newness—the ‘generic’ nature—of the procedure. 
If procedure of fidelity is generic, it does not recognize established 
distinctions of hierarchies within the situation.  Consequently it bears 
both a universal address: this event happened to and for everyone in 
the situation; and what Badiou terms an “immanent axiom of 
equality”—everyone is equal in their response to the event.110 
 
 109 Feltham, supra note 22, at 231. 
 110 Id. at 231-32. 
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I would locate the “abnormal event” of post-9/11 common law 
constitutionalism in the necessity for constitutional courts in the face of 
executive and legislative responses to 9/11 and waging of the War on 
Terror to address their role in the face of a radical—because apparently 
open-ended—state of exception.  Significantly, it came in the wake of 
the “Human Rights revolution” that began in 1945, and was 
symptomatized by the making of laws that proceeded in opposition to 
the ethos of international human rights law111 inaugurated by that 
revolution, effectively by implicitly112 or explicitly113 denying the 
humanity of “others.” 
Next, Michel Rosenfeld’s analysis of the early post-9/11 
jurisprudence of the Israeli, U.K. and U.S. constitutional courts, which 
argues that post-9/11 constitutional jurisprudence emerges from what he 
calls conditions of stress rather than conditions of crisis or 
emergency,114 that a jurisprudential “paradigm of the war on terror” is 
“emerging,”115 and that the existing “law of war,” “criminal law,” and 
“police powers” paradigms are inadequate to the challenges of post-9/11 
constitutionalism,116 suggests that post-9/11 common law constitutional 
outsider jurisprudence manifests the characteristics of an evental site: a 
“structure of immanent exception,” to which present “representational 
mechanisms” characteristic of commerce, the media, and government, 
are inadequate classify, analyze, or synthesize.117 
What of the intervention, the recognition of the evental?  In the 
case of specifically indigenous Australian politics in the context of 
Australian politics more broadly conceived of, Feltham argues, there is 
no capacity to recognize an indigenous political subject, and the 
symptom of this “immanent exception” is the discourse of excess and 
lack that characterize “Australian” conceptions of indigenous peoples: 
 
 111 While there had been some post-Human Rights Revolution circumscriptions of criminal 
procedural protections for those accused of terrorism in the English government’s campaign 
against the IRA, for example, the control order jurisprudence is distinctively different not merely 
because its abolition of procedural protections is vastly more radical than its pre-9/11 
predecessors, but also because it postdates the fundamental change in the English constitutional 
structure marked by the passage of the HRA.  The capacity for the relegation of criminal 
procedural “due process” to the realm of statute is fundamentally changed by the HRA. 
 112 Detainees in both the British and Australian regimes discussed in this Article are 
constructed as lacking the markers of citizen-subjectivity, of conventional criminality, or of 
conventional alienage. 
 113 Sexually violent predators are represented in the Australian jurisprudence as lacking 
humanity, see discussion of Baker, infra; there are also egregious examples of this phenomenon 
in the literature on Guantánamo detainees, see, for example, John Shiffman, Mission: Fairness, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 9, 2007, at A1 (reporting that staff at Guantánamo and the U.S.-based 
head of the military prosecuting team for the prison had a saying, “don’t pet the terrorist”). 
 114 Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 2081. 
 115 Id. at 2149. 
 116 Id. at 2093. 
 117 Feltham, supra note 22, at 232. 
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excessive consumption of government money; excessive demands for 
land; an apology, perceived as per se excessive; inadequate civilization 
(of indigenous peoples); inadequate resources (to do justice to 
indigenous dispossession.)118 
The discourse of excess and lack is critical to recognizing the 
existence of an evental-site, intervening to name the occurrence of an 
event.  Discussing the problematics of “whether one can securely 
identify evental-sites,” Feltham suggests that “[t]his suggests that it is 
undecidable whether a site is evental in the absence of an event”: 
The method for the ontological analysis of situations thus cannot 
follow a verificationist model; we must accept that it will be heuristic 
and pragmatic. . . . I have argued that indigenous politics in Australia 
constitute a generic truth procedure, and the indigenous peoples 
themselves constitute an evental site in the situation of Australian 
politics.  In Australian governmental discourse the indigenous 
peoples are always said to be either excessive or lacking: excessive 
in their political demands, their drain on the public purse, their 
poverty; lacking in their recognition of the government’s ‘good 
intentions’, in their community health standards, in their spirit of 
enterprise and individual responsibility, etc.  It is possible to 
generalize these structural characteristics of excess and lack by 
arguing that inasmuch as the state has no measure of the contents of 
an evental site, the site will continually appear to be radically 
insufficient or in excess of any reasonable measure.  One can thus 
adopt the criteria for the existence of an evental-site that it marks the 
place of unacceptable excess or lack in the eyes of the state.119 
So too in the post-9/11 Australian asylum-seeker jurisprudence, 
asylum-seekers are increasingly represented by the majority on the High 
Court as placing demands on the law—specifically on the courts and the 
judges—that are excessive; and, in the paradigm of catch-22, as lacking 
appeal to the majority who might protect them from executive over-
reaching by statute.  In A. [No. 2], the U.K. detainees are constructed as 
invoking an excessive supra-national constitutional structure. 
As to the enquiries that constitute a “‘procedure of fidelity’ to the 
event,”120 and the development of generic procedures of judging equal 
to it, the detail of Feltham’s application of Badiou’s theory of the event 
and of militant political subjects merits discussion, as does an account 
of what his thesis about Australian indigenous politics has to tell us 
about what I argue is a new crisis in the theory and practice of common 
law judging of others.121  This is the case despite histories of both 
 
 118 Id. at 233. 
 119 Feltham, supra note 12, at xxv-xxvi (emphasis added). 
 120 See supra text accompanying note 110. 
 121 I should note at this point that I register and largely do not differ from Peter Hallward’s 
argument that September 11th itself is productive only of “non-generic procedures of fidelity.”  
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making constitutional exceptions for others in “emergencies,” for 
example in the governmental acts that gave rise to Korematsu, and in 
the legal regime that constituted part of British governmental response 
to the IRA; and in founding modern nations on principles of hierarchy 
and exclusion that circumscribe the reach of law’s protective aegis, 
and/or carve out zones for selective applications of legal violence, as, 
for example, in the denying of what I will carefully call the status of 
subjects to indigenous Australian and enslaved African-Americans.  The 
difference derives, as my discussion of the abnormal event that is post-
9/11 common law constitutionalism suggests, in two things: first, the 
transformation of the logic of emergency in the contemporary, 
distinctively postmodern Western Anglophone common law systems’ 
post-9/11 engagement between nation and others because of what is 
experienced and indeed constructed as its infinitude; and in the parallel 
development of a law for “others” since the middle of the 20th century 
that defies the period’s dominant Whig historical accounts of the 
progress of the discourses of egalitarian democracy, of “human rights,” 
and human dignity.  To give an example of that latter phenomenon, 
contrast the discourse of the Australian High Court in the Mabo 
decision about being frozen in age of racial discrimination with the 
Gleeson Court’s formalist hermeneutics of frank racism. 
Another example might be found in Lyndon Johnson’s 
unacknowledged invocation of the Anglo-American poet W. H. 
Auden,122 in his turn invoking W.B. Yeats, in the “Daisy” advertisement 
for the 1964 presidential election: “These are the stakes.  To make a 
world in which all of God’s children can live or to go into the dark.  We 
must either love each other or we must die.”123 Johnson carried that 
 
See Feltham, supra note 22, at 240. 
 122 Or rather, the invocation of Bill Moyers, his speechwriter. 
 123 This invocation of equality in the form of love was quoted in the Philadelphia Inquirer by 
Inquirer journalist David Aldridge in an article about the crisis of the killing of (and often by) 
black men in the U.S., a crisis that bears all the signs of a constitutional crisis, albeit one that 
presently goes unrecognized.  Aldridge characterized the advertisement, which featured a 
mushroom cloud, that predecessor image of the crumbling twin towers, as “otherwise 
demagogic.”  David Aldridge, Time to Stop All the Dying, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 29, 2007, at 
D4.  A day earlier, in a televised debate between candidates for the Republican nomination for 
presidential candidacy, against the backdrop of the discourse about illegal migration by  across 
the symbolic (southern) border, with its attendant fantasies of one, Southern, impermeable 
continent-spanning fence, Senator McCain had said, “We must recognize [illegal immigrants] are 
God’s children as well.  They need our love and compassion, and I want to ensure that I will 
enforce the borders. But we won’t demagogue it.”  Editorial, The Immigration Tussle: My Fence 
Is Bigger, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 2, 2007, at C6.  Both in the U.S. as in France, it might be 
suggested, where at the time of writing this Article riots by impoverished black and Muslim 
youths in immigrant ghettoes in the banlieu had erupted for the second time in two years, the 
denial of the exclusion of the black and/or Muslim other, no matter how much formally a citizen, 
from the equality before the law that citizenship promises, are constitutional crises that go 
unrecognized because of an official discourse of colorblindness and an ingrained cultural 
tolerance of racial and religious inequality and intolerance.  See Jenny Barchfield & John 
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election in the wake of the assassination of John F. Kennedy; the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and the March on Washington.  
The subsequent passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, in the wake of 
the March(es) on Montgomery, made the U.S. formally a democracy for 
the first time.  Contrast with this the recent flurry of legislative and 
constitutional amendments in the U.S. “denying rights” to sexual 
minorities who seek the ability to marry in a way that is recognized by 
domestic law, or in the alternative legal intimate partnership status.  Or 
what is or may be (in the spirit of the undecidability of the occurrence 
of the event) the Roberts Court’s inaugural defining decision on 
constitutions and others, the Seattle School District case, in which the 
majority decision rendered inequality invisible, forgot the nation’s 
history of racial inequality, reverted from the normative equality of 
Brown to Chief Justice Taney’s orientation to others in Dred Scott. 
Feltham identifies the rendering invisible and thus in some sense 
“absent” of the indigenous inhabitants of “Australia” indigenous 
inhabitants at the moment of colonial invasion, English colonial and 
“Australian” constitutional law “inaugurated a fundamental dislocation 
between Australian politics and the land itself,”124 as, one might equally 
say, between the land and the nation eventually there constituted, or 
between Australian constitutional law and indigenous Australians.  He 
identifies this as an event, in Badiou’s terms, “that is, an anomalous 
disruption which occurs at a structural flaw in a situation and 
inaugurates an infinite process of explorative change,” and locates 
“indigenous politics faithful to the Tent Embassy as the sole political 
practice capable of addressing the fundamental dislocation of Australian 
politics; hence the singularity of this practice.”125 
Feltham identifies the successive policies and practices visited by a 
series of Australian government since 1788 on indigenous Australians 
as “reflecting erasure and exclusion.”  He also notes the risks of what he 
posits as the only political action that “can address the fundamental 
dislocation of the Australian body politic,” that is, “the action of an 
indigenous politics”: it “risks its own dislocation due to the unending 
processes of colonization exercised by the Australian body politic.”  He 
proposes that Badiou’s account of “generic process of fidelity” to the 
event can provide a way to think through such recuperative 
colonization, to estimate the chances of escaping it.126 
Why has the crisis of common law judicial practice and ontology 
 
Leicester, A Color-blind Country?, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 2, 2007, at A2.  At the same time, in 
Timor Leste, riots provoked by inequality, an exclusion from the full meaning of citizenship, are 
framed by the media as explicitly constitutional events and as crises that threaten the nation. 
 124 Feltham, supra note 22, at 225.  
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 226. 
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that is my focus evental, rather than one of a challenges posed by series 
of acts of bad faith by states, a species of business as usual?127  Why is 
the orientation towards judging practice and judicial ontology that it has 
engendered to some extent in Justice Sullivan and, as I will go on to 
argue, in its most developed form in Justice Kirby, properly identifiable 
as a generic truth procedure?  My tentative answer is that it is because 
their post-9/11 constitutional jurisprudence reveals that the 
contemporary common law constitutional judiciary can evidently no 
longer pretend that constitutional inequality is either exceptional or an 
artifact of a benighted but recuperated history anterior to the emergence 
of international human rights law norms in the wake of the Third Reich.  
There is, rather, the emergence of a judicial recognition of constitutional 
inequality as the other self of the rule of (constitutional) law, always 
imminent, always encroaching, always requiring vigilance to discern 
when it becomes constitutional.  The radical egalitarian commitments of 
this new jurisprudence inhere both in its insistence on egalitarian 
relations between state and citizen, state and other, and citizen and 
other, and in the egalitarian address of the militant judge to those he 
judges.  Drawing on and making analogies with Feltham’s analysis of 
indigenous politics in Australia,128 contemporary constitutional 
inequality has of course been recognized in sites beyond constitutional 
courts—in academic discourse, in the frequent skepticism of those 
marginalized in a constitutional culture about rights or citizenship.  It 
has, however, been “structurally null and void”129 for postmodern 
common law constitutional courts themselves. 
Let me turn to analysis of Justice Kirby’s post-9/11 constitutional 
jurisprudence.  Feltham registers that for Badiou an evental site can 
only be recognized as such “once an event occurs at its location.”130 The 
“first act of an intervention,” capable of transforming “action into . . . 
event”131 is its “naming.”132  Thus Justice Kirby, for example, dissenting 
in Al-Kateb, the case of a stateless Kuwaiti-born Palestinian, detained 
after his unlawful entry into Australia, and unable to be deported 
because of his statelessness, whose indefinite detention the High 
Court’s majority held authorized, identifying World War II as a 
watershed in the history of judicial review to protect “others”133 against 
 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 233 (noting that “indigenous political subjectivity is [not] null and void per se,” and 
arguing that “in alternative situations such as that of international indigenous politics, and that of 
various academic networks, indigenous political subjectivity is both present in many ways.”  But 
that “[i]t is solely within the situation of Australian politics that indigenous peoples constitute an 
evental site in terms of their political capacities.”). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 234. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Al-Kateb v. Godwin (2004) 219 C.L.R. 562, 621 (Kirby J., dissenting) (asserting that “I do 
PETHER.FINAL.VERSION 5/1/2008  12:15:59 AM 
2008] MILITANT JUDGMENT?  2301 
“[e]xecutive assertions of self-defining and self-fulfilling powers,”134 
and asserting common law constitutional law-making powers.135  This 
meets with incomprehension and consternation (which Feltham labels 
“confusion”)136 on the part of the state, which cannot “understand—
classify and dominate—the relationships between this new name and 
these previously unknown elements of its situation.”137  The event is, 
then, “undecidable.”138  State responses of this kind might be located in 
threats made by a Bush government functionary against law firms 
acting pro bono for Guantánamo detainees, encouraging their paying 
commercial clients to exact a form of economic sanctions against them 
for this apparently transgressive behavior,139 or the labeling of lawsuits 
brought in response to the Bush government’s secret electronic 
surveillance program unpatriotic,140 while at the same time recognizing 
the role of the Federal Courts in intervening in rights-based challenges 
to governmental action both in using Guantánamo, secret CIA prisons, 
and “extraordinary rendition” to escape the jurisdiction of those Courts, 
and in instituting NSA surveillance beyond that apparently authorized 
by statute and reviewable by the secret FISA Court. 
If I am right, and the post-9/11 crisis of common law judging of 
others has produced on the part of the state reactions that situate judicial 
resistance of legislative and executive commands that others are beyond 
the jurisdiction of the courts, and thus in a fundamental sense of the law 
(courts may be conceived of as distinctively legal institutions; 
legislatures are political as well as legal institutions)—then the event is 
complete when the judicial militant rejects “the non-place assigned 
to”141 the courts in intervening in relations between state and subject.  
 
not doubt that if Australia were faced with challenges of war today, this Court, strengthened by 
the post-War decision in the Communist Party Case and other cases since, would approach the 
matter differently than it did in the decisions which McHugh J has cited with apparent approval.  
Respectfully, I regard them as of doubtful authority in the light of legal developments that 
occurred after they were written.”). 
 134 Id. at 616. 
 135 Id. (responding to Justice McHugh’s assertion, Al-Kateb, 219 C.L.R at 595, that “the 
justice . . . of the course taken by the Parliament [in legislating to provide for indefinite 
immigration detention] is not examinable in this or any other domestic court” because “[i]t is for 
not for courts . . . to determine whether the course taken by Parliament is unjust or contrary to 
basic human rights”). 
 136 Feltham, supra note 22, at 234. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 235. 
 139 See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Law Firm Boycott Call Raises Ethical Issues: Experts Differ on 
Whether Defense Official Broke Rules, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 2007, at A6 (quoting Bush 
Administration Official Charles “Cully” Stimson, who advocated corporate clients firing 
commercial law firms who provided pro bono lawyers for Guantanamo detainees). 
 140 Morning Edition: Senate Mulls Immunity for Telecoms (NPR radio broadcast, Nov. 8, 
2007) (quoting Sen. Jon Kyl, identifying as unpatriotic to fail to do what the government tells you 
to do). 
 141 Feltham, supra note 22, at 235. 
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The response of Justice Kirby to another such manifestation of 
“undecidability”—the varying attempts of Australian state governments 
to place the indefinite detention of certain criminal defendants beyond 
the jurisdiction of courts to review142 while “using the forms of judicial 
procedure to mask the reality of the legislative decree,”143 and the 
increasingly permissive, deferential to Legislature and Executive,144 and 
narrowly positivist responses of his brother judges to the Howard 
government’s analogous strategy of detaining “Islamic” asylum seekers 
in extremely harsh and isolated conditions,145 in some cases 
indefinitely146—was just such a militant rejection.147 
Justice Kirby’s militant intervention began with his dissent in Al-
Kateb, discussed supra, in which he additionally invoked Chapter III 
judicial power as a source of “unenumerated rights,” specifically those 
of procedural and substantive due process.148  In that case, Chief Justice 
Gleeson and Justice Gummow joined him in dissent, both joining him in 
citing as a ground for their decision that Al-Kateb’s appeal against his 
indefinite detention should be allowed on the traditional basis for 
judicial review in Parliamentary states: that statutes are to be interpreted 
by “not imput[ing] . . . to the legislature an intention to abrogate or 
curtail certain human rights or freedoms (of which personal liberty is 
the most basic) unless such an intention is clearly manifested by 
unambiguous language.”149  Justice Gummow’s dissent additionally 
invoked the nature and incidents of Chapter III judicial power, an 
explicitly constitutional doctrine, holding that there were limits on the 
power of the legislature to authorize the executive to indefinitely detain, 
beyond which it would be unconstitutionally intruding on judicial 
 
 142 See Baker v. The Queen (2004) 210 A.L.R. 1; Fardon v. Attorney-General (Queensland) 
(2004) 210 A.L.R. 50. 
 143 Baker, 210 A.L.R. at 6 (Gleeson, C.J.) (characterizing Baker’s argument that the legislation 
assigned to Chapter III courts functions incompatible with Chapter III judicial power). 
 144 Which in the Australian Constitutional context lack practical separation of powers, despite 
the formal separation articulated in Chapters I and II of the Australian Constitution, because of 
the de jure Executive Government’s contemporary practice of deference to the de facto Executive 
Government constituted by the Prime Minister, who is by convention the leader of the party 
which controls the House of Representatives, the lower house of Australia’s bicameral 
Parliament. 
 145 See Behrooz v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 
(2004) 219 C.L.R. 486; Re Woolley; Ex parte Applicants M276/2003 (by their next friend G.S.) 
(2004) 210 A.L.R. 369. 
 146 See Al-Kateb v. Godwin (2004) 219 C.L.R. 562 (Kirby J., dissenting); Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v. Al Khafaji (2004) 219 C.L.R. 664. 
 147 See Feltham, supra note 22 at 235 (contrasting the reaction of the Australian state to the 
event constituted by the Tent Embassy with the militants’ “reject[ion] . . . [of] the non-place 
assigned to indigenous peoples within the situation of Australian politics” by declaring “separate 
sovereignty” and “a stake in the very land that the Australian government had assumed was 
uniquely its own to legislate upon.” 
 148 Al-Kateb, 219 C.L.R. at 616-18. 
 149 Id. at 577 (Gleeson, C.J., dissenting). 
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power.150 
In his dissent in Behrooz, Justice Kirby insisted on the power of 
judicial review of the conditions of immigration detention;151 invoked 
the nature and incidents of a robust uniquely judicial power informed by 
international law,152 and the vibrancy of common law constitutional 
judging comprising ancient common law “unenumerated” rights of the 
kind reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights153; and 
articulated the requirement that Australian law be interpreted and 
applied such that it is in conformity with international law, including the 
especially the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) and its First Optional Protocol, to both of which Australia is 
a signatory.154 
In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs v. Al Khafaji,155 handed down the same day as Al-Kateb, Justices 
Gummow and Kirby likewise dissented from a majority decision 
allowing an Iraqi national who had fled Iraq for Syria and whom the 
Australian government had not been able to deport to Syria.  Justice 
Gummow again relied on Chapter III constitutional grounds.156  
Agreeing with Justice Gummow on the constitutional grounds for 
dismissing the Minister’s appeal, Justice Kirby emphasized the 
relevance of international law to detention cases, while framing his 
analysis in terms of the traditional narrow ambit of judicial review in 
Parliamentary systems: 
The interpretation of the Act favoured by Gummow J has an added 
attraction for me.  It is supported by the presumption that Australian 
statutes (such as the Act) are to be interpreted and applied, as far as 
their language permits, so as to be in conformity with international 
law, including the international law of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.  This principle ensures that Australian law is construed so 
that it is not needlessly in breach of the obligations binding upon 
Australia under international law.  Since the earliest days of this 
Court, the latter principle has been one that has helped to guide this 
Court in the construction of Australian legislation. 
International law, like the common law of Australia, has a strong 
presumption in favour of individual liberty and against a power of 
indefinite detention by the executive government.  Certainly, that is 
how an ambiguous statutory provision in this country is to be read. 
This case affords no exception.  In relevant respects, the Act is 
 
 150 Id. at 609-14 (Gummow, J., dissenting). 
 151 Behrooz v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 
(2004) 219 C.L.R. 486, 503. 
 152 Id. at 517-20, 522-26. 
 153 Id. at 524. 
 154 Id. at 522-26. 
 155 (2004) 219 C.L.R. 486. 
 156 Id. at 524. 
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ambiguous. In such circumstances, this Court should certainly 
uphold an interpretation that denies to the Executive what is 
effectively a self-defining and self-fulfilling power of indefinite 
detention of the respondent.  Such a power would be incompatible 
with Ch III of the Constitution.  It would also be inconsistent with 
past decisions of this Court that have declined to extend such self-
determining powers to the Executive.157 
Baker v. The Queen158 was the first of the 2004 High Court cases 
dealing with challenges to “preventive detention” of sexual offenders 
based on the Chapter III judicial power grounds first articulated by the 
Brennan High Court in Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions 
(N.S.W.).159  Kable held unconstitutional a statute purportedly 
conferring jurisdiction on the New South Wales Supreme Court to issue 
preventive detention orders to detain an individual named in the statute 
after the expiry of his sentence for the manslaughter of his wife, on the 
grounds of “incompatibility with the essence of [federal] judicial 
power,”160 which it held had been exercised by the Supreme Court in 
the case.  Justice Toohey, a member of the Kable majority, wrote: 
Preventive detention under the Act is an end in itself. And the person 
so detained “is taken to be a prisoner within the meaning of the 
Prisons Act 1952”.  It is not an incident of the exclusively judicial 
function of adjudging and punishing criminal guilt. It is not part of a 
system of preventive detention with appropriate safeguards, 
consequent upon or ancillary to the adjudication of guilt. . . . In the 
present case the Act requires the Supreme Court to exercise the 
judicial power of the Commonwealth in a manner which is 
inconsistent with traditional judicial process. . . . The function 
exercised by the Supreme Court under the Act offends Ch III 
which . . . reflects an aspect of the doctrine of the separation of 
powers, serving to protect not only the role of the independent 
judiciary but also the personal interests of litigants in having those 
interests determined by judges independent of the legislature and the 
executive.  The function offends that aspect because it requires the 
Supreme Court to participate in the making of a preventive detention 
order where no breach of the criminal law is alleged and where there 
has been no determination of guilt.161 
His sister judge, Justice Gaudron, also a member of the Kable 
majority characterized the preventive detention proceedings as 
“proceedings [not] otherwise known to the law.”162 
In Baker itself, the majority of the High Court rejected a challenge 
 
 157 Id. at 527.  
 158 (2005) 225 C.L.R. 513. 
 159 (1996) 189 C.L.R. 51. 
 160 Id. at 96. 
 161 Id. at 98. 
 162 Id. at 106. 
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to N.S.W. state legislation that had the effect of radically circumscribing 
the availability of parole for offenders sentenced to life terms.163  The 
legislation was passed after Baker’s co-accused in the highly-publicized 
abduction, torture, rape and murder of Virginia Morse, who like him 
had been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-
release recommendation, had successfully applied for the fixing of a 
minimum non-parole period.164  In the parliamentary debates 
accompanying the passage of the legislation a number of persons 
convicted of particularly heinous rapes and murders, including Baker 
himself, had been identified as the intended objects of the legislation.165  
One aspect of the challenge concerned the statutory requirement that the 
Supreme Court find “special reasons” before it would permit an 
offender who had been made the subject of a life sentence with a non-
release recommendation at sentencing to apply for a determination of a 
minimum non-parole period.  Invoking Kable’s constitutional doctrine, 
Baker argued unsuccessfully that the requirement of “special reasons” 
was “devoid of content, . . . illusory . . . . [and] involved the Supreme 
Court in a charade,” because “[t]he legislature was using the forms of 
judicial procedure to mask the reality of the legislative decree, which 
was that these people were never to be released.”166  Additionally, he 
argued unsuccessfully that the exercise of this function involved the 
Court in making determinations of a kind foreign to judicial power.167 
Justice Kirby’s dissent was as scathing as it was wide-ranging.  
Characterizing the legislation as an attempt to undermine “the integrity 
of the judicial power,”168 to “‘dress up’ as a judicial function the making 
of orders which, in truth, are designed to implement the clearly-stated 
parliamentary objective that the named ‘animals’, including the 
appellant, ‘never see the exit sign at the prison gate.’”169  He 
characterized the legislation as analogous to that found unconstitutional 
in Kable: “an attempt to involve the judiciary in the performance of 
punitive decisions effectively already determined by parliament 
itself.”170  He further found that the legislation was ad hominem,171 
retroactive in effect,172 “seriously arbitrary and discriminatory,”173 and 
that in context the requirement for a judicial finding of “special reasons” 
for the determination of a non-parole period was “included to permit the 
 
 163 BLACKSHIELD & WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 753-54. 
 164 Id. at 753. 
 165 Id. at 754 (quoting Paul Whelan, New South Wales Minister for Police). 
 166 Id. at 754. 
 167 Baker, 223 C.L.R. at 533-34. 
 168 Id. at 546. 
 169 Id. at 547. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 548. 
 173 Id. at 552. 
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conscription of judges of the New South Wales Supreme Court into a 
charade pretending to the availability of discretion . . . when in truth it 
was intended to ensure that the judges could never, in law or fact, order 
the eligibility for release of any of the named offenders.”174 
Justice Kirby also appealed to judicial consideration of legislation 
of this kind in the context of both foundational constitutional theory,175 
and international human rights law, arguing both that the legislation 
contravened the ICCPR because of its retroactive operation,176 and in 
respect of one of the named targets of the legislation, who was 14 when 
he committed the offence for which he was convicted, also contravened 
Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, because it had 
the effect of subjecting that offender to “life imprisonment without the 
possibility of release.”177  He urged independence of Constitutional 
Court judges from the response of public opinion to their decisions,178 
made it plain that in his view the Article III judicial power doctrine was 
critical for the “protection of fundamental rights.”179  “Subject to the 
Constitution,” he wrote, “only the courts of this country stand as 
guardians of . . . the avoidance of serious excesses and departures from 
. . . human rights.”180 
In this series of cases, then, we see Justice Kirby insisting on and 
invoking a law above and beyond the positive law made by organs of 
the state, whether legislature or executive, intervening when the state 
visits its institutional violence on others in ways that instantiate 
constitutional inequality.  In Fardon, the penultimate case in this series, 
he went further. 
Fardon, once again, saw Justice Kirby in sole dissent when the 
Court rejected a challenge to a state statute providing for preventive 
detention of serious sexual offenders after the completion of their 
sentences.  Finding the legislation unconstitutional on Chapter III 
judicial power grounds, he invoked the “fundamental principle [of 
liberty] that lies deep in our law,”181 asserting that “[i]n Australia, we 
formerly boasted that even an hour of liberty was precious to the 
common law,” and asking, rhetorically, 
[h]ave we debased liberty so far that deprivation of liberty, for yearly 
intervals, confined in a prison cell, is now regarded as immaterial or 
insignificant? Under the Act, just as in the law invalidated in Kable, 
 
 174 Id. at 558. 
 175 Id. at 536 (calling for interpretation of the legislation “from the standpoint of substance, not 
mere form,” of a kind appropriate for interpreting a “Dog Act”). 
 176 Id. at 560. 
 177 Id. at 559. 
 178 Id. at 542-43. 
 179 Id. at 561. 
 180 Id. at 539. 
 181 Fardon v. Attorney-General (Queensland) (2004) 210 A.L.R. 50, 91. 
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the prisoner could theoretically be detained for the rest of the 
prisoner’s life. This could ensue not because of any past crime 
committed, but because of a prediction of future criminal conduct.182 
Most significantly for my purposes here, he relied upon another 
fundamental principle of constitutionalism as of Badiou’s theory, 
equality: 
Protection of the legal and constitutional rights of minorities in a 
representative democracy such as the Australian Commonwealth is 
sometimes unpopular.  This is so whether it involves religious 
minorities, communists, illegal drug importers, applicants for refugee 
status, or persons accused of offences against anti-terrorist laws.  
Least of all is it popular in the case of prisoners convicted of violent 
sexual offences or offences against children.  Yet it is in cases of 
such a kind that the rule of law is tested.  As Latham CJ pointed out 
long ago, in claims for legal protection, normally, “the majority of 
the people can look after itself”: constitutional protections only really 
become important in the case of “minorities, and, in particular, of 
unpopular minorities.”  It is in such cases that the adherence of this 
Court to established constitutional principle is truly tested, as it is in 
this case.183 
Militant, he also asserted the legitimate role of constitutional courts 
in judicial review of legislative and executive action, once again naming 
the “confusion and refusal”184 of the Australian government in the face 
of that assertion, and employing a generic procedure of truth in 
formulating a robust Chapter III judicial power jurisprudence: 
Recent, and not so recent, experience teaches that governments and 
parliaments can, from time to time, endeavour to attract electoral 
support by attempting to spend the reputational currency of the 
independent courts in the pursuit of objectives which legislators 
deem to be popular.  Normally, this will be constitutionally 
permissible and legally unchallengeable.  However, as Kable 
demonstrates, a point will be reached when it is not, however popular 
the law in question may at first be. The criteria for the decision are 
stated in Kable in general terms.  Yet such is often the case in 
constitutional adjudication.  Evaluation and judgment are required of 
judicial decision-makers responding, as they must, to enduring 
values, not to immediate acclaim.185 
In the final case in the series, Re Woolley; Ex parte Applicants 
M276/2003 (by their next friend GS),186 in the face of increasing 
 
 182 Id. at 93-94. 
 183 Id. at 87-88. 
 184 Feltham, supra note 22, at 235. 
 185 Fardon, 210 A.L.R. at 87. 
 186 (2004) 225 C.L.R. 1.  Justice Kirby has more recently dissented in the first High Court 
control order case, Thomas v. Mowbray, No. M119/2006 [2007] H.C.A 33 (2 Aug., 2007), 
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2007/33.html, which held interim 
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evidence of his isolation on the Court, Justice Kirby took a different 
tack, and one which, while intervening with a militancy as sharply 
marked as—if differently framed from—his earlier jurisprudence on 
constitutional inequality, suggested an evolving strategy in the work of 
egalitarian constitutional change.  Arguably his agreement with the 
other members of the court in rejecting the children’s application for 
release was rendered inevitable by stare decisis, as he indicated,187 and 
by the way the action was brought on behalf of Afghani children 
subjected to immigration detention, on habeas and other prerogative 
writ grounds.188  Unlike Behrooz, they were not alleging that they had 
been deprived of the opportunity to prove their detention factually 
inhumane, but rather that the immigration detention of minors was per 
se inhumane, and thus constituted “punishment” that it was improper for 
the legislature rather than a court to impose.189 
In any event, he held that the legislative mandate was too 
unambiguous for the challenged detention to be read in such a way as to 
bring it into harmony with international human rights law norms,190 and 
this, he concluded, deprived him of grounds for using the hermeneutic 
strategy in his Behrooz and Al-Kateb dissents of yoking together a 
conventional technique for judicial review in sovereign parliamentary 
systems, the normative commitments of International Human Rights 
Law, constitutional common law doctrines, and Chapter III judicial 
power doctrine.191  Arguably, too, the challenged legislation here did 
not embroil the Courts in legitimizing detention as did the legislation 
challenged in Baker and Fardon.  All that said, however, it seems 
possible that Justice Kirby might have held on constitutional common 
law grounds—of the kind he had invoked in Behrooz—that the Court, in 
exercising parens patriae powers, had jurisdiction to grant the writs 
sought on the children’s behalf.  And perhaps interpreting the 
authorizing legislation as unsalvageable by a reading in harmony with 
non-positivist constitutional law—what he called “the general principle 
of Australian law that statutes are read so as not to offend international 
law, and not to derogate from fundamental rights, unless the words of 
the statute are clear”192—was less inevitable than Justice Kirby 
suggested.  This conclusion is in turn suggested by his reliance on 
successive Australian governments’ failure to amend the challenged 
 
control orders constitutional, inter alia, on Chapter III grounds. Justice Hayne likewise dissented 
on the issue of whether giving federal judicial officers the responsibility to decide to issue such 
orders conferred on non-judicial power on a federal court in breach of Chapter III. 
 187 Re Wooley, 225 C.L.R. at 72. 
 188 Id.  
 189 Id. at 65. 
 190 Id. at 71. 
 191 Id. at 71-73.  
 192 Id. at 69. 
PETHER.FINAL.VERSION 5/1/2008  12:15:59 AM 
2008] MILITANT JUDGMENT?  2309 
legislation in the face of “repeated parliamentary and official reports”193 
and his concession that there were “differentiated provisions in the Act 
relating to adults and children,”194 which an apparently unexceptionable 
resorting to certain canons of statutory interpretation might have 
suggested could yield a different outcome. 
In the event, Justice Kirby’s jurisprudential approach to the “work 
of change”195 was a different—and apparently strategic—one.  He 
named the inadequacy of the traditional narrow form of judicial review 
in the context of states with sovereign Parliaments: not enforcing rights-
denying legislative or executive acts in the absence of a clear intent that 
this was what was intended.  He thus made a powerful implicit case for 
his repeated appeals to law beyond the limits of positivism.  Further, 
taking the intransigence of successive Australian governments about 
asylum detention and indeed about various mandates for the 
constitutional inequality of others at its word—which denies the courts 
the role of protectors of the human rights of those subject to 
constitutionally unequal treatment while frequently attempting to use 
the courts to legitimate that treatment—he named the result of state 
lawlessness, placing back on the citizen-subjects who elected 
governments deaf to non-positivist law and on those governments their 
responsibility for constitutionalism.  Or for its absence: 
In the light of this history and on the face of the public record of the 
Parliament, the suggestion that there has been some oversight, 
mistake or a failure to consider the immigration detention of children 
in Australia is fanciful.  Detention is the deliberate policy of the 
Australian Parliament, repeatedly affirmed. In default of a 
constitutional basis for invalidating it, it is the duty of this Court to 
give effect to the Act, whatever views might be urged about the 
wisdom, humanity and justice of that policy. 
Human rights requirements:  International human rights treaties to 
which Australia is a party contain provisions relevant to the 
detention of children. Such provisions apply to conditions of restraint 
such as “immigration detention”.  The requirements of such treaties 
were considered in B.  The most specific and important of such 
provisions appears in Art 37 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (“UNCROC”).  More general provisions are 
contained in Arts 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 7.1, 9.1, 18.1 and 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). 
Australia has signed the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.  
Pursuant to the accession to that treaty, a communication was taken 
to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (“UNHRC”), 
complaining that the provisions of the Act, specifically as they relate 
 
 193 Id. at 69-70. 
 194 Id. at 69. 
 195 Feltham, supra note 22, at 235. 
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to children, contravene the obligations accepted by Australia under 
international law in consequence of its ratification of the ICCPR.  
The UNHRC upheld that complaint.  It did so over the contrary 
arguments made on behalf of Australia.  Other international bodies 
have also criticised Australia in respect of the provisions of the Act 
obliging universal mandatory detention. 
However that may be, assuming that there is a breach of international 
law established by the failure of the Act, and the administration of 
the Act, to comply with the treaties binding Australia, such a breach 
does not, as such, affect the validity of the provisions of the Act or 
the duty of this Court to give effect to those provisions as part of a 
valid law of this nation.  In construing any ambiguities in such law, it 
is legitimate for a court to interpret the law, so far as its language 
permits, to avoid departures from Australia’s international 
obligations.  However, where, as here, the law is relevantly clear and 
valid (and is the result of a deliberately devised and deliberately 
maintained policy of the Parliament) a national court, such as this, is 
bound to give it effect according to its terms.  It has no authority to 
do otherwise.196 
What might a militant procedure of common law constitutional 
judging of others involve?  Such a practice of judging will be 
heteroglossic,197 like the accounts of an English constitutionalism that 
renders evidence obtained by torture inadmissible in the seriatim 
opinions in A. [No. 2].  It will be at once egalitarian and relational, 
situating the judge in a relationship of equals with those others on 
whom she passes judgment, rather than positing a judicial “identity-in-
itself” because “[t]here are only identities-for-themselves-and-for-others 
inasmuch as any identity is structurally the product of a web of 
relationships clustering around the single point designated by a proper 
name.”198  Robust accounts of Chapter III judicial power are examples 
of such an egalitarian and relational praxis.  And it will resist what 
Feltham calls canalization, or capturing by the ordinary institutions of 
government199: in the context of developing a theory of judging this 
might involve resisting claims like those made by Justice Scalia about 
the antidemocratic nature of the common law, or claims for finding 
judicially-recognizable norms in the actions of legislatures. 
Let me gesture towards what applying this analysis to post-9/11 
 
 196 Re Woolley, 225 C.L.R. at 70-71. 
 197 See Feltham, supra note 22, at 228 (writing of an indigenous politics that does not “effac[e] 
. . . the diversity of its voices”). 
 198 Id. at 229 (generating this account of identity in addressing an indigenous political critique 
of discourses on “aboriginality” appropriated for racist purposes, and identifying a “way . . . of 
speaking or thinking an indigenous politics without effacing the diversity of indigenous voices, 
without getting caught up in the trap of identity-in-itself, and without getting caught up in 
governmental procedures”). 
 199 Id. 
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constitutional judging might suggest: that the dis-ease of the British 
judiciary and inadequacy of traditional British constitutional methods to 
what, drawing on but to some extent differing from the work of Michel 
Rosenfeld,200 I’ll suggest is a new type of constitutional crisis, 
specifically in the splits opening between appellate judges in these 
cases, suggest that the confluence of post-9/11 and supra-national 
constitutionalism in Britain is a “necessary but not sufficient”201 ground 
for a generic truth procedure which we likewise see in the Gleeson High 
Court’s jurisprudence of and for others.  Justice Kirby’s militant judicial 
intervention,202 his emergent praxis of post-9/11 constitutional judging, 
marks a distinctive break with comparative constitutional law’s 
orthodoxy of proportionality, a break that is “capable of redressing the 
fundamental dislocation”203 of existing discourses and practices of 
constitutional judging by state lawmaking post 9/11.  That is, that his 
“enquiries”204 constitute a “generic procedure of fidelity.” To quote 
Feltham in another context, Justice Kirby’s genuinely philosophical 
account of Chapter III duty “thinks local thoughts of justice.”205 
Feltham goes on to argue that “only those political, scientific, 
artistic and interpersonal situations which comport evental-sites may 
give rise to a situation-transforming truth procedure,” that “[f]or 
Badiou, it is the structure of historical sites alone that provides a 
possible location for an event and for the unfolding of a praxis,” and 
that “the existence of an evental-site is not enough to ensure the 
development of a praxis; for that, an event must occur.”  “Events,” he 
writes, “happen in certain times and places which rupture with the 
established order of things,” and “[i]f they are recognized as harboring 
implications for that order, then a transformation of the situation in 
which they occur may be initiated.”206  And “the concept of a rupture 
and an ensuing structural change of a situation could be compared to the 
notion of an epistemological break.”207 
What is left to the militant judge of common law constitutionalism 
post-9/11, in the era of “the long war,” is a “long slow process of 
supplementation,”208 which we might identify in the development of the 
jurisprudence of what is proper to courts, whether framed in terms of 
 
 200 One of stress rather than either emergency or ordinary conditions.  See Rosenfeld, supra 
note 16.  I differ from his analysis both in relation to the differential treatment of subject/citizen 
and others, and in suggesting that emergencies may often be at least in significant part, internally 
rather than externally-created, as in contemporary Pakistan, or the Third Reich. 
 201 Feltham, supra note 22, at 241. 
 202 Id. at 232. 
 203 Id. at 224. 
 204 Id. at 232. 
 205 Id. at 241. 
 206 BADIOU, supra note 3, at xxvi. 
 207 Id. at xxvii. 
 208 Id. at  xxviii. 
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the nature and incidents of Chapter III judicial power, or that of due 
process, or that of abuse of process, or indeed of any form of common 
law constitutional discourse, not Romantic or avant-garde invention,209 
which one might analogize to naïvely decontextualized discourses on 
“human rights” and “human dignity” on the one hand, or the frankly 
instrumental substantive due process jurisprudence that produced the 
increasingly fragile reproductive rights jurisprudence of the U.S. 
Supreme Court and the heteronormative sentimentality of Lawrence v. 
Texas rather than insisting on radical equality, which for my purposes, 
as for Badiou’s, is manifest in love. 
Other aspects of Badiou’s thought that are of use in the project of 
theorizing a judging practice equal to a militant engagement with the 
emergent “jurisprudence of exception” in comparative common law 
constitutional contexts, and the militant judicial ontology that might be 
equal to this evental rupture, are his characterization of the “entirely 
corrupt representative and electoral form” of late 20th century 
“democracy,”210 his teasing reference to “what, among the differences, 
legitimately matters to subjects,”211 and his identification of the critical 
limits of the power of language, the excess of a materialist ontology 
over “the powers of language to define and differentiate it.”212 
Feltham’s insights into how Badiou radically rethinks the relations 
of subject and language suggest a special aptness, too, of Badiou’s work 
for thinking through the ontology and truth procedures of the militant 
common law constitutional judge. “[b]ecause [Badiou’s conception of 
praxis] . . . includes a certain use of language . . . it is transmissible 
between subjects.  This is what allows Badiou, when removing the 
determinism of the Marxist model, to avoid embracing some form of 
mysticism or a spontaneous participation in truth on the part of an 
initiated elite.”  Such a “generic truth procedure,” a praxis of common 
law judging, a “subjectivization in a truth procedure,”213 which “takes 
time . . . [and] unfolds according to principles—an operator of fidelity, 
the names generated by the enquiries,” and its “[transmission] from 
subject to subject . . . thus remain[ing] . . . the property of no one in 
particular,”214 might be equal to the post-9/11 crisis of common law 
constitutional judicial ontology confronted with its obligations to judge 
the other in the face of claims legitimating jurisdictions of exception. 
And finally—or rather gesturing towards “the sense of an ending,” 
given that Badiou confines truth procedures to the realms of art, politics, 
 
 209 Id. at xxvii. 
 210 Id. at xii. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Feltham, supra note 12, at xxiii. 
 213 Id. at xxix. 
 214 Id. 
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science, and love215—where might we locate jurisprudential truth 
procedures?  My suggestion is that jurisprudential truth procedures 
ought properly be located in the realms of love and of poetry.  To place 
law in the realms of either science or politics216 is on the one hand to 
deny that law—and the judges—have ethical choices that affect both 
how they develop as judicial subjects, in their ontological project, and in 
how they judge others, and on the other to deny the distinctiveness of 
the institutions, discourses, subjects and practices of law from those of 
politics, and thus to accede to the purely political majoritarianism 
epitomized by the deference of courts to state power of the kind that 
Michael Kirby has named. 
By contrast, Badiou identifies the radical alterity within the loving 
subject that the encounter with the other in love produces: “[I]t is in 
love that thought frees itself from the powers of One, and is exercised 
according to the law of the ‘Two.’”217  And a practice of judging that is 
a generic truth procedure in the domain of love requires a radical 
precommitment to justice, which I will call equality of judge and other, 
a “[belief] without knowing why,”218 or, as Peter Hallward glosses it 
“[f]idelity to love implies attestation before justification.”219  Poetry, 
paradigm of the literary genre, forcefully asserts the uncertainty of 
interpretation as the methodology of truth: “[P]oetry makes truth [fait 
vérité] of the multiple as presence come to the limits of language.  It is 
the song of language insofar as it presents the pure notion of ‘there is’ 
[il y a], in the very erasure of its empirical objectivity.”220 
Oliver Feltham powerfully identifies the radical and transformative 
praxiological potential of Being and Event in the radical uncertainty that 
this philosophy both implies and depends on, its “anxiety, obsession and 
desire”221: 
The fundamental source of the ‘practicality’ of Badiou’s theory of 
praxis is his placing it under the signs of possibility and contingency: 
there may be an evental site in a situation, an event may happen at 
that site, someone may intervene and name that event, others may 
identify an operator of fidelity, series of enquiries may develop, and 
finally, at a global level, these enquiries may be generic.222 
The necessary uncertainty of the subject as to the occurrence of an 
event is at the heart of what might be the virtues of Badiou’s account of 
being and event for a theory of post-9/11 constitutional judicial 
 
 215 Id. at xviii. 
 216 See id. at xviii (discussing logical positivism). 
 217 HALLWARD, supra note 13, at 186 (quoting Alain Badiou). 
 218 Id. at 187. 
 219 Id. at 187. 
 220 Id. at 197 (quoting Alain Badiou). 
 221 Feltham, supra note 12, at xxviii. 
 222 Id. 
PETHER.FINAL.VERSION 5/1/2008  12:15:59 AM 
2314 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:5 
ontology and militant judging, given the manifest inadequacy of 
existing legal subjects and theories of judging and of constitutional law 
to deal with the exigencies of judging the other in post-9/11 
constitutionalism.  A text that suggests what such an anxious, obsessed, 
desiring judicial subject, engaging in a principled way with “particular 
praxes which may be generic,” “slowly transform[ing] and 
supplement[ing] a historical situation”223 in which the common law 
constitutional judiciary finds itself, guided only by the “immanent 
imperatives” deriving from “the actual inquiries” made by “the operator 
of fidelity,”224 might be found in the increasingly anguished, and 
increasingly militant, jurisprudence of Michael Kirby, “unfold[ing] . . . 
new structures of being and . . . writ[ing] . . . the event into being,” 
“cast[ing . . . himself out of his] outside . . . recogniz[ing and 
‘naming’]225 an event,” recognizing both the constitutional judge’s—
and constitutionalism’s—other, and in judging those on whom he passes 
judgment his equals, inscribing equality,226 becoming equal to the 
event:227 
History evidences many patterns of unacceptable intrusions by other 
sources of power into the independence of the judiciary.  These 
should not be dismissed as irrelevant to Australia.  They have 
occurred in “highly civilized” countries, with strong legal and 
judicial traditions. . . . One pattern of intrusion into judicial functions 
may be observed in what occurred in Germany in the early 1930s.  It 
was provided for in the acts of an elected government. Laws with 
retroactive effect were duly promulgated. Such laws adopted a 
phenomenological approach.  Punishment was addressed to the 
character of the criminal instead of the proved facts of the crime, . . . 
[and meted out on] “criminal archetypes,” . . . those who harmed the 
nation. . . . In the Communist Party Case . . . Dixon J taught the need 
for this Court to keep its eye on history,. . . so far as it illustrated the 
over-reach of governmental power. . . . I dissent from the willingness 
of this Court, having stated the principle [of judicial independence of 
Chapter III courts], now repeatedly to lend its authority to its 
confinement. . . . This has been done virtually to the point where the 
principle itself has disappeared at the very time when the need for it 
has greatly increased. . . .228 
I began this Article with an epigraph drawn from W. H. Auden’s 
Law Like Love, a poem that registers both the capacity of law to be no 
more than state force, and the possibility of law’s end, as well as our 
incapacity to identify or describe or locate it with certainty—it’s 
 
 223 Id. at xxx. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Feltham, supra note 22, at 234. 
 226 Id. at 240. 
 227 Id. at 239. 
 228 Fardon, 210 A.L.R. at 101. 
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interpretability, if you like.  The poem closes in analogizing law and 
love as unpredictable, powerful, difficult—qualities of the evental and 
of the militant: 
Like love we don’t know where or why, 
Like love we can’t compel or fly, 
Like love we often weep,  
Like love we seldom keep. 
In the spirit of Peter Goodrich’s invitation to “reconstruct . . . a 
case law of love,”229  a law that “challenges the law of masters,” whose 
“radical sources and practices . . . include . . . the rebels, critics, 
marginals, aliens, women and outsiders,”230 I will end with a quotation 
from another Auden poem, one that revived its existing readership and 
found a new one in the wake of 9/11, September 1, 1939.  Auden 
rewrote its most famous line when the poem was anthologized in 1955, 
after postmodernity had learned many but evidently not all of the 
lessons made available by the “state of exception” that effected the end 
of law in the Third Reich. 
Auden changed that line from “[w]e must love one another or die” 
to “[w]e must love one another and die,” because of his sense of the 
inadequacy to truth of the original, or what we, following Badiou and 
echoing Auden himself, might call its Romanticism.  For my purposes 
here the alteration might be read to bring into being a radical 
uncertainty that keeps both meanings in play, invoking the imperatives 
of love and of death, and thus suggesting the choice that the call to a 
militant—or heretical231—life demands.  Common law constitutional 
judges bear a responsibility, in the event, to determine what version of 
“Democracy” we and others will experience, whether others will 
experience a rule of law like love, or as no more than raw state power 
clothed in the rhetoric of legality.  Their choice is between deferring to 
dictators, acquiescing in their mandate to do evil to others, or in the 
alternative to respond to Equality’s call, which is that of Love, in 
crafting just messages, messages of “truth and courage,”232 “destined for 
everyone”233: 
I and the public know 
What all schoolchildren learn, 
Those to whom evil is done 
 
 229 GOODRICH, supra note 104, at 11. 
 230 PETER GOODRICH, LAW IN THE COURTS OF LOVE: LITERATURE AND OTHER MINOR 
JURISPRUDENCES 2 (1996). 
 231 GOODRICH, supra note 104, at 215 (noting that after “the Church banned Capellanus and 
the Treatise on Love in 1277,” “[t]he courts of love . . . belonged in the heretical tradition”). 
 232 HALLWARD, supra note 13, at 202 (quoting Alain Badiou). 
 233 Id. at 197. 
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Do evil in return. 
 
Exiled Thucydides knew 
All that a speech can say 
About Democracy, 
And what dictators do, 
The elderly rubbish they talk 
To an apathetic grave; 
Analysed all in his book, 
The enlightenment driven away, 
The habit-forming pain, 
Mismanagement and grief: 
We must suffer them all again. 
 
Into this neutral air 
Where blind skyscrapers use 
Their full height to proclaim 
The strength of Collective Man, 
Each language pours its vain 
Competitive excuse: 
But who can live for long 
In an euphoric dream; 
Out of the mirror they stare, 
Imperialism’s face 
And the international wrong. 
*** 
The windiest militant trash 
Important Persons shout 
Is not so crude as our wish: 
What mad Nijinsky wrote 
About Diaghilev 
Is true of the normal heart; 
For the error bred in the bone 
Of each woman and each man 
Craves what it cannot have, 
Not universal love 
But to be loved alone. 
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From the conservative dark 
Into the ethical life 
The dense commuters come. . . . 
*** 
All I have is a voice 
To undo the folded lie, 
The romantic lie in the brain 
Of the sensual man-in-the-street 
And the lie of Authority 
Whose buildings grope the sky: 
There is no such thing as the State 
And no one exists alone; 
Hunger allows no choice 
To the citizen or the police; 
We must love one another or die. 
 
Defenceless under the night 
Our world in stupor lies; 
Yet, dotted everywhere, 
Ironic points of light 
Flash out wherever the Just 
Exchange their messages: 
May I, composed like them 
Of Eros and of dust, 
Beleaguered by the same 
Negation and despair, 
Show an affirming flame. 
 
